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Abstract 
It has been argued that disorders in body-ownership and aberrant experiences in self-
consciousness are due to biases in multisensory integration.  Here we examine whether such 
biases are also associated with spontaneous Out-of-Body Experiences (OBEs) in a non-
clinical population.  One-hundred and eighty participants took part in a rubber-hand illusion 
(RHI) experiment with synchronous and asynchronous visual and tactile stimulation.  A 
realistic threat was delivered to the rubber-hand after a fixed period of stimulation.  Self-
report exit questionnaires measured the subjective strength of the illusion and 
psychophysiological measures (skin conductance responses / finger temperature) provided an 
objective index of fear / anxiety towards the threat. Control participants reported a stronger 
RHI, and revealed larger threat-related skin conductance responses during synchronous 
compared with asynchronous brushing.  For participants predisposed to OBEs, the magnitude 
of the skin conductance was not influenced by brushing synchrony - fear responses were just 
as strong in the asynchronous condition as they were in the synchronous condition.  There 
were also no reliable effects of finger-temperature for either group.  Collectively, these 
findings are taken as support for the presence of particular biases in multisensory integration 
(perhaps via predictive coding mechanisms) in which imprecise top-down tuning occurs 
resulting in aberrant experiences in self-consciousness even in non-clinical hallucinators.    
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Out-of-body experience; Multisensory integration; Hallucination; Rubber hand 
illusion; Predictive coding.  
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Statement of Public Significance 
Stable experience of our bodies is dependent on the coherent integration of multiple sources 
of sensory information.  However, the mechanisms underlying this seemingly effortless 
process can breakdown resulting in hallucinatory anomalous bodily experiences.  One such 
experience is the Out-of-Body experience (OBE) where the observer reports experiencing the 
world from a vantage point outside of the physical self.  Using a body illusion task (the 
Rubber-Hand illusion), this study provides novel experimental evidence that the brain 
processes mediating typically stable and coherent self-consciousness are biased in those 
predisposed to hallucinatory Out-of-Body Experiences.  Collectively the present findings 
show, for the first time, these inherent biases may well underlie a predisposition to anomalous 
and hallucinatory experiences even in non-clinical groups.  Implications for contemporary 
theories of multisensory integration and self-consciousness are discussed.       
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Introduction 
Coherent self-consciousness is dependent on a multitude of neurocognitive mechanisms and 
processes including: the experience of body-ownership (the experience of one’s body being 
one’s own: Ehrsson, 2012; Gallagher, 2005), the experience of embodiment (the perception of 
using and having a body, and that one’s sense of self is localised within one’s bodily 
boundaries), being a physical, feeling, and acting self, and the concept of presence (the 
conscious experience of  being present in the here and now: Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel & 
Blanke, 2006; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, 
& Dolan, 2004; Metzinger, 2004; Sanchez-Vives and Slater, 2005; Seth, 2009; 2013; 2014; 
Seth & Friston, 2016;  Seth Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012).  These factors can vary in their 
intensity across experiences with important consequences for self-consciousness.   
 The dominant current view is that self-consciousness results from successful 
multisensory integration (e.g., between visual, tactile, somatosensory, and vestibular 
modalities) that occurs constantly within the brain.  Indeed, these processes are typically 
stable, durable and reliable, providing a unified experience of the 'self' across time.  However, 
a growing body of research is revealing that breakdowns in multisensory integration can 
occur and result in striking disorders of body-ownership  (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Blanke & 
Arzy, 2005; Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002; Blanke, Landis, Spinelli & Seeck, 2004; 
Blanke, Slater & Serino, 2015; Braithwaite, Broglia & Watson, 2014; Brugger, 2002; Seth, 
2009; 2013; Seth et al., 2012).  These instances show that rather than being fixed and 
permanent, multisensory integration is flexible and fallible - which can lead to aberrant 
experiences of embodiment, body-ownership and self-consciousness.  Examining the 
neurocognitive mechanisms that cause such breakdowns can help us to build theoretical 
models, not just for how such disorders occur, but also for how stable embodiment emerges 
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from the flux of neural processing, thus informing scientific ideas on fundamental aspects of 
human self-consciousness.     
 One form of aberrant body experience is the Out-of-Body Experience (OBE).  OBEs 
can be defined as an experience in which observers perceive the world from a vantage point 
outside of their physical body (Blackmore, 1982; Braithwaite & Dent, 2011; Braithwaite, 
Samson, Apperly, Broglia & Hulleman, 2011; Cook & Irwin, 1983; Irwin, 1985).  In terms of 
phenomenology, OBEs can be reported as being incredibly vivid and 3-dimensional with the 
perceptual qualities of veridical perception.  Although such experiences can happen in 
association with psychopathology and neurological conditions (i.e., schizophrenia, epilepsy, 
migraine: Blackmore, 1986; Comfort, 1982; Critchley, 1950; Gabbard, Twemlow & Jones, 
1982; Lippman, 1952; 1953; Sacks, 1995; Siegel, 1977), they can also occur in the apparent 
complete absence of them (in non-clinical groups: Blackmore, 1982; Braithwaite & Dent, 
2011; Braithwaite et. al., 2011; 2014, Braithwaite, Mevorach, & Takahashi, 2015;  Easton, 
Blanke, & Mohr, 2009; Irwin, 1981; Murray & Fox, 2005; Twemlow, Gabbard & Jones, 
1982).  For non-clinical groups, hallucinatory OBEs have been associated with specific biases 
in exocentric perspective-taking, body-transformation processes and increased cortical 
hyperexcitability demonstrated via behavioural and brain-stimulation methods (Blackmore, 
1987; Braithwaite, Broglia, Bagshaw, & Wilkins, 2013a; Braithwaite, et al, 2011a; 2013b; 
2013c; 2015; Cook & Irwin, 1983).  
 There are a number of overarching frameworks for understanding aberrant perceptions 
currently enjoying considerable attention.  These include (but are not restricted to); 
multisensory disintegration, dysconnection, predictive coding, and aberrant saliency accounts.  
Aberrant experiences like the OBE have been linked to a disruption or breakdown in 
multisensory integration processes which typically sub-serve a coherent unified sense of an 
embodied self (Blanke et al., 2002, 2004; Blanke & Arzy 2005; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; 
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Stein & Stanford, 2008). Consequently, the OBE is seen to represent a somewhat distorted 
model of selfhood that occurs due to abnormal patterns of brain activation impacting on the 
integration of multisensory information.  It follows that damage or disruption in key networks 
responsible for the online and dynamic integration of multisensory inputs can result in 
aberrations of self-consciousness (Blanke et al., 2002; 2004; Blanke & Arzy, 2005).  
Examples of such anomalous body experiences include; (1) autoscopic hallucinations; (2) 
heautoscopic hallucinations; (3) sensed-presence experiences; and in terms of the present 
study; (4) the OBE.      
Although a useful and influential view, the generic notion of a ‘breakdown’ in 
multisensory integration is somewhat ambiguous.  It is not clear what is necessary or 
sufficient for such breakdowns to occur or how exactly this breakdown manifests 
spontaneously, even more so in non-clinical hallucinators.  Dysconnection accounts propose 
that aberrant connectivity, either between the senses, or within different levels of 
hierarchically organized representations, impact on the timing of multisensory integration and 
stable self-consciousness – resulting in disorders of conscious experience (Friston, 1998, 
1999; Fuster, 1995; Pettersson-Yeo, Allen, Benetti, McGuire, & Mechelli, 2011; Stephan 
Baldeweg, & Friston, 2006; Stephan, Friston, & Frith, 2009)1.  Applied specifically to 
aberrant body experiences like the OBE, such dysconnection might occur between visual, 
tactile, vestibular, and somatosensory processing, impacting on the effective integration of the 
incoming information and thus the experience of selfhood and embodiment.  
Salience accounts propose that observers place unwarranted priority (attentional and / 
or emotional) on irrelevant information leading to both aberrant self-perceptions and the 
formation of delusional beliefs (Kapur, 2003). These processes can be related to the idea of 
                                                          
1 Note the concept of 'dysconnection' refers to aberrant connectivity - which includes over or under connectivity within and 
between brain regions with consequences for the efficacy of functional processing. 
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hyperreflexivity, where patients with schizophrenia have been shown to place an aberrant 
emphasis on internal bodily signals which in turn magnifies the impact of such signals in 
general body awareness with implications for experience and belief (Sass & Parnas, 2003; 
Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, & Medford, 2013).  Under these circumstances, body signals dominate 
the contents of consciousness and receive reciprocal boosts as a result of attentional 
processing being directed towards them which, in turn, culminates in a self-perpetuating cycle 
of hyperreflexivity.  
 Expanding on ideas of sensory processing, predictive coding accounts have also been 
extended to explain the existence of body-ownership, agency, the sense of presence, and 
disorders within these concepts (Clark, 2013; Corlett, Frith & Fletcher, 2009; Corlett, Honey, 
& Fletcher, 2007; Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher & Krystal, 2010; Friston, 2005; 2010; 
Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; see also Apps & Tsakiris, 2014). Predictive coding accounts 
argue that perceptual systems need to reconcile new sensory evidence against pre-existing 
expectations (referred to as priors) that drive predictions about the self and its surroundings.  
According to these accounts, the brain is seen as constantly trying to minimise the mismatch 
or prediction error between incoming sensory signals and the emerging internal models 
generated to explain them.  Stable self-consciousness results from the successful “explaining 
away” of the emerging prediction error occurring between these sources in the system at that 
time so that bottom-up sensory data and top-down predictive models dovetail as neatly as 
possible.  The lower the degree of sensory discrepancy between these factors, the more stable 
the experience of selfhood becomes.   
Seth and colleagues have proposed an 'interoceptive inference' version of predictive 
coding in which emotion or, more accurately, 'interoception' is at the centre of this predictive 
process (Seth, 2009; 2013; 2014; Seth et al., 2012; Seth & Friston, 2016; Critchley et al., 
2004; see also Barrett & Simmons,2015; Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Herbert, Herbert & 
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Pollatos, 2011; Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez & Costantini, 2011).   Interoception refers to an 
awareness of internal physiological and visceral body signals and the generation of subjective 
feeling states (emotion). Exteroception relates to the perception of incoming signals from the 
outside world / environment. The interoceptive inference account argues that body-ownership 
and presence are moulded by predictive multisensory integration of self-referent signals 
arising from both interoceptive and exteroceptive sources.  By this account, subjective feeling 
states (emotions) are the consequence of predictions about the interoceptive state of the body.  
Applied to disorders of presence and embodiment, aberrant experiences arise due to 
pathologically imprecise interoceptive predictive signals.  
 Note that, the different theoretical accounts discussed above may not strongly conflict 
in their attempts to provide theoretical frameworks for understanding embodiment, presence, 
and disorders of the self. For example, a breakdown in multisensory integration is, in some 
ways, a description of the product / outcome of underlying aberrant processes.  Those aberrant 
processes themselves could be conceptualised via dysconnection impacting on the timing of 
integration, aberrant salience processes, or a predictive coding model.  For example, 
dysconnection theories posit that brain regions can be hyper or hypo connected within 
themselves and between regions within functional architectures. This pattern of aberrant 
connectivity has clear implications for the efficacy of functional processes. That is, 
dysconnection could impact on the generation, maintenance and modification of multisensory 
contingencies (i.e., the generation of priors and their effectiveness in reducing prediction-
error) that are central to the interoceptive / predictive coding account as well as impact on the 
integrity and timing of the incoming (exteroceptive) information. A similar argument can be 
made for aberrant saliency accounts, perhaps even more so when one considers these ideas in 
view of recent interoceptive inference accounts of predictive coding in which a role for 
emotion is central.   
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Experimental induction of anomalous body experiences: The Rubber-hand 
illusion (RHI) 
The Rubber-hand illusion (RHI) depends on the integration of multisensory inputs into a 
hierarchical representation of the embodied self and provides a useful experimental method 
for exploring body-ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Longo, 
Schuur, Kammers, Tsakiris & Haggard, 2008).  In the RHI observers watch a prosthetic 
rubber-hand being stroked, in synchrony with the ‘felt’ stroking of their own unseen physical 
hand.  After a short while, observers typically report a feeling of 'ownership' of the rubber-
hand as if it was part of their physical body. The illusion is typically attenuated when the 
visual and tactile stimulation are presented asynchronously. Importantly, the illusion provides 
a method for manipulating and altering the processes of body-ownership, embodiment, and 
the online representation of the body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; 
Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Longo, et al., 2008; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & 
Haggard, 2006). 
 The presence and strength of the illusion has been measured in a variety of ways 
including subjectively via exit questionnaires, and more objectively, via skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) measuring fear / emotional arousal responses to a threat-stimulus presented 
to the rubber-hand, proprioceptive drift (where the perceived location of the real hand 
migrates to the location of the rubber hand), drops in skin temperature and brain-imaging 
(e.g., Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Costantini & Haggard, 2007; 
Ehrsson, 2007; 2009; Ehrsson, Spence & Passingham, 2004; Ehrsson, Wiech, Weiskopf, 
Dolan & Passingham, 2007; Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Longo et al., 2008; 
Moseley et al., 2008; Ocklenburg, Rüther, Peterburs, Pinnow, & Güntürkün, 2011; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, et al., 2006; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard & Fink, 2007).   
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 The illusion has been used to examine anomalous body experiences in both patient 
groups and non-clinical hallucinators (Braithwaite et al., 2014; Peled, Ritsner, Hirschmann, 
Geva, & Modai, 2000; Thakkar, Nichols, McIntosh, & Park, 2011).  For example, in a 
previous study we found that those predisposed to anomalous body experiences, also took 
longer to report the presence of the illusion (relative to a control group), and displayed distinct 
profiles in autonomic responses suggesting atypical biases in multisensory integration 
(Braithwaite et al., 2014).  
 Collectively these studies show that the RHI can be used to explore intersensory 
contingencies and their role in body-ownership.  In addition, they provide initial evidence for 
the presence of biases in multisensory integration and that such biases are associated with 
aberrations in self-consciousness.  However, despite this, there is a paucity of research 
exploring the RHI and the over-arching theoretical frameworks outlined above in those 
predisposed to sub-clinical levels of aberrant perceptions / hallucinations of self-
consciousness. This is an important omission because current accounts only posit such biases 
as part of psychopathology / neurological conditions, and fail to account for the presence of 
sub-clinical hallucinations.  In addition, if such biases in multisensory integration are present 
in sub-clinical populations, this would significantly expand the applicability of the theoretical 
accounts so far proposed.  
 Despite a growing popularity in research on multisensory integration and anomalous 
experiences in self-consciousness, few studies have actually investigated these factors in non-
clinical groups specifically screened for predisposition to such experiences. Typically, studies 
use a low number of participants to represent the whole sample (circa N=15 to 20), that take 
part in a given experiment and the emerging conclusion is often that such findings have 
‘implications’ for anomalous body experience (experiences which were never actually 
screened for, explored or delineated within the sample in the first place, see Braithwaite et al., 
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2014, for a similar discussion).  There are additional reasons why failing to explore individual 
differences by screening and testing participants in this way might be problematic.  Evidence 
is now emerging that dissociative experience can be fractionated along central experiential 
dimensions, which reflect a diverse underlying neurocognition, and that such experiences are 
indeed present in the general population.  Therefore, experimental samples might 
unintentionally include hallucinators who reflect very different neurocognitive biases to 
control participants. Furthermore, the participants within such a group might well exhibit a 
diverse range of neurocognition themselves.  
For example, depersonalization-type experiences may well be dissociative but the 
experience of self remains within the physical body (Braithwaite et al., 2013c; Dewe, Watson 
& Braithwaite, 2016; Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016; Sierra & David, 2011; Sierra, 2009).  In 
contrast, in the OBE, there is a shift in experiential perspective where the self is liberated 
from its physical shackles, and the differences between these forms of dissociative experience 
do appear to be associated with diverse neurocognitive biases (Braithwaite et al., 2013c; 
Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016).  As a consequence, interpreting such general ‘implications’ 
from studies that do not attempt to differentiate between these factors becomes difficult, with 
these recent developments placing some restrictions on the scope of subsequent conclusions.  
A consequence of this is that we are not aware of any previous published study that has 
coupled RHI methods to specific investigations of OBEs in sub-clinical groups2.         
  
 
Overview of the present study 
The present study examined whether biases in multisensory integration and emotional 
processing were present and associated with spontaneous Out-of-Body Experiences (OBEs) in 
                                                          
2 Thakkar et al. (2011) do identify a single OBE participant in their study – but no formal statistical comparison is made and 
the participant is reported anecdotally.  Braithwaite et al. (2014) investigated a large sample of those predisposed to general 
anomalous body experiences which included but was not restricted to OBEs.   
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a non-clinical population. This was achieved by inducing anomalous experiences of limb 
ownership (using the RHI), and by exploring autonomic emotional responses to perceived 
body threats in those predisposed to spontaneous OBEs and control groups.  Subjective (exit 
questionnaire responses) and previously established objective psychophysiological responses 
(SCRs and finger temperature) were used as indices of the presence and strength of the 
illusion. 
 In line with other work, we expected that there would be an association between the 
strength of emotional response to threats under conditions of an experimentally induced body-
illusion and the predisposition to report spontaneous OBEs and anomalous hallucinatory 
experiences. If the OBE is associated with aberrant emotional processing then one prediction 
is that emotional fear responses (SCRs) elicited during the RHI may be distinct from the 
typical pattern reported for control groups. This would be revealing with respect to the latent 
intersensory biases underlying the illusion, underlying stable embodiment and spontaneous 
aberrant body experiences like the OBE.    
 For example, if OBEs reflect a similar form of dissociative experience as those 
reported by patients with Depersonalization disorder (DPD), then one would predict an 
overall suppression of emotional reactivity (for both synchronous and asynchronous RHI 
brushing conditions), as has been shown for Depersonalization groups when viewing aversive 
stimuli (Phillips et al, 2001; Sierra et al., 2002, Sierra, 2009; Sierra & David, 2011; see Dewe 
et al, 2016; for evidence with sub-clinical groups using a novel real body-threat paradigm).  It 
has been argued that this emotional suppression is responsible for the experience of one's own 
body not feeling real and bodily sensations feeling flattened, dull and lifeless.    
In contrast, the OBE group might show increased fear responses either overall (for 
both synchronous and asynchronous conditions) or for only one of the brushing conditions, 
relative to the control group.  The former finding may implicate a general aberrant emotional 
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response - consistent with aberrant saliency accounts of anomalous experiences but also 
extended here to include aberrant emotional processing tied to body experience specifically 
(cf. Kapur, 2003). The latter finding might also be more consistent with an interoceptive 
inference account in that the OBE group may make less precise predictions and over-attribute 
any close visuo-tactile contingencies as coming from themselves even when this is not the 
case. Such findings would provide clear evidence for the presence of such biases and advance 
our understanding of the processes underlying these experiences.  
 Two objective psychophysiological measures were recorded; skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) and finger temperature3. Drops in finger temperature have been associated 
with fear responses and have been demonstrated under RHI conditions for the hand under-
going the illusion (Moseley et al., 2008; Kammers, Rose, & Haggard, 2011: though see also 
Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Paton, Hohwy, & Enticott, 2012; for failures to replicate).  Both SCRs 
and finger temperature provided independent measures of psychophysiological processing 
relating to anxiety, fear and emotion.    
 The present study went significantly beyond previous work in a number of important 
ways.  First, we directly examined intersensory biases between a non-clinical group reporting 
spontaneous OBEs (as an instance of aberrant self-consciousness) relative to a large control 
group.  We explored how predisposition to the OBE related to emotional processing by 
examining whether such individuals showed an enhanced or suppressed emotional response - 
suggesting important differences in body-ownership / embodiment for these individuals.  
 Second, by exploring these effects in non-clinical hallucinating groups, we expand 
significantly the applicability of some of the latest theories relating to psychopathology into 
wider populations.  If such biases are present and measurable, in-between hallucinatory 
                                                          
3 Note – due to controversies and ambiguity over the validity of proprioceptive drift (PD), and that drift can occur without 
even the induction of the illusion, we prefer to use SCRs as an objective measure of embodiment induced via a threat 
stimulus (see Rhode et al., 2011; Holle et al., 2011; Crucianelli et al., 2013; for examples of problems with PD measures). 
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episodes, this would suggest the presence of aberrant multisensory integration processes as a 
general background trait even in sub-clinical populations and in the absence of potent drugs.    
 In the present study, a large number of participants completed a host of questionnaires 
designed to quantify predisposition to anomalous dissociative experiences. They also 
completed a screening questionnaire for elucidating the presence of OBEs (see Appendix B). 
These measures were coupled with two independent psychophysiological responses known to 
provide an index of emotional / fear responses (SCRs and finger temperature). The 
psychophysiological measures were taken under two RHI conditions in which participants 
experienced the illusion (synchronous brushing) and a non-illusion control (asynchronous 
brushing).   
 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty participants were recruited from (1) the School of Psychology at the 
University of Birmingham UK, (2) the general public via a short television feature that 
appeared on the local news asking for interested participants to come forward and (3) the 
Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, UK.  Of the 180 tested, 164 were female 
(91%), and 171 (95%) were right-handed. Participants ranged in age from 18–65 years ( X  = 
22 years, SD = 8.83). Using an Out-of-Body Experience pre-screen questionnaire (see 
Braithwaite et al., 2013a; 2011), 31 participants (17%) were classified as ‘OBEers’ (87% 
female, X age = 32 years, SD = 16.41, range 18-65 years), with a remaining 149 making up 
the control group (92% female, X  age = 20 years, SD = 3.66, range 18 - 49 years). At the 
time of recruitment, all participants were screened for any excessive fear / aversion / phobia to 
needles or blood.   
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Questionnaire Measures 
Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale (CAPS) 
The Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006) consists of 32-items 
measuring predisposition to anomalous experiences across several modalities. Similarly to 
previous investigations of the CAPS with OBE samples, an additional question on whether 
participants had experienced an OBE was included to help identify OBEers. This question 
was used to delineate the OBE group but was not included in the numerical analysis for that 
group (the 'yes' scores were removed from the analysis for the OBE group so that they did not 
artificially inflate CAPS scores relative to controls). Participants were asked to respond ‘Yes’ 
or ‘No’ for each item (scored 1/0 respectively). These Yes / No responses represented the 
basic endorsement of such experiences. For every ‘Yes’ response, there was an additional 5-
point scale on how frequently the experience occurred and on how intense the experience was 
(both on a 5-point Likert scale),  
 
Temporal Lobe Experience Factor (TLE): 
Eleven items from the original CAPS measure have been identified as being highly correlated 
with each other, reflecting a ‘Temporal-Lobe Experience Factor’, (items Q1, Q2, Q4, Q6, 
Q10, Q12, Q16, Q24, Q26, Q27 and Q32; Bell et al., 2006). Previous research has shown that 
those predisposed to OBEs score higher than controls on these specific items (Braithwaite et 
al., 2011; 2013a; 2015). The scoring of these items is the same as that described above for the 
CAPS and both the presence and frequency of these experiences were measured. Note, this 
means that our analysis is based separately on the remaining 21 CAPS items and the 11 TLE 
items. 
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Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) 
The Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (Sierra & Berrios, 2000; Sierra & David, 2011) is a 
29-item measure of dissociative experiences typically associated with Depersonalization (DP) 
and Derealization (DR). Although OBE groups have been shown to score highly on some of 
the factors from the CDS measure, the OBE is a very different dissociative experience to 
DP/DR. Depersonalization pertains to feelings of disconnection and detachment from oneself, 
one’s body, and one’s thoughts. In contrast, Derealization is associated with feelings of 
disconnection and detachment from one’s surroundings. Participants provide a frequency 
score on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Never), to 4 (All the time) and provide a 
duration rating using a 6-point Likert scale, 1 (Seconds) to 6 (Over a week). Final scores for 
each item are then pooled across Frequency and Duration ratings, giving a potential range of 
scores between 0-290. A clinical cut-off score of 70 has been established and produces a 
sensitivity of 75%, with high internal consistency (Cronbach alpha = 0.89) and half-split 
reliability (0.92).  Sierra, Baker, Medford and David (2005) established a 4-factor structure 
for the CDS (accounting for 73.3% of the variance). These factors were; (a) Anomalous 
Bodily Experiences (ABE); (b) Emotional Numbing (EN), (c) Anomalous Subjective Recall 
(ASR), and (d) Alienation from Surroundings (AFS; pertaining to experiences of 
derealization). This four-factor solution is used to explore responses across the present 
sample.  
 
Out-of-Body Experience (OBE) Pre-screen Questionnaire 
If participants answered 'yes' to the basic OBE question that we added to the CAPS measure, 
then they also completed a short OBE pre-screen. The pre-screen contained 24-items that 
measured phenomenological aspects of OBEs, such as experiencing an external perspective, 
the frequency of such experiences, their vividness, whether the experiences were visual or 
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not, the degree of connection felt by the observer to their physical body and the out-of-body 
perspective etc. (see Braithwaite et al., 2011; 2013a; 2013b; for similar versions of the screen 
and Appendix B). The pre-screen was designed primarily to ensure those who claimed to have 
had an OBE were categorizing their experience with accepted definitions of the experience 
which cannot be achieved by a basic single question4. 
 
Rubber-hand illusion Exit Questionnaire (RHI Exit Q) 
The Rubber-hand illusion exit questionnaire was a hybrid exit questionnaire, based mainly on 
previous literature (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Mussap & Salton, 2006; Longo et al. 2008). It 
consisted of 15-items, each with a response scale ranging from -5 (Definitely Not) to +5 
(Definitely Yes). Positive values indicated increased subjective endorsement of the illusion. 
The RHI exit questionnaire consisted of 7 items designed to measure the actual embodiment 
experienced (i.e., the convincingness of the illusion / ownership of the rubber-hand), and 8 
control items (designed to explore the degree of suggestibility and response bias within the 
sample: see Appendix A). 
 
Electrodermal Activity (EDA) – Skin Conductance Responses (SCR) 
All psychophysiological measures were acquired via a Biopac MP36R data-acquisition unit 
fitted with a 24-bit A/D converter (Biopac systems Inc, Goleta, CA). The unit was connected 
to a HP pro Elitebook 8740w laptop (8GB RAM / 450GB memory) with an Intel® core™ i7 
based processor (CPU, a 2GHz NVIDIA quadro 5000M graphics card, and 64-Bit Windows 
7OS). The data-acquisition rate was 2000 samples per second with the gain set to x1000. 
Signals were recorded via Ag-AgCL pre-gelled (Biopac isotonic gel: 101) 1cm disposable 
                                                          
4 Based on unpublished findings from our laboratory, we estimate that between 20% - 30% of individuals incorrectly 
characterise their anomalous body perceptions as an OBE, thus establishing the importance of a screening measure.   
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electrodes (EL507) connected to EDA sensor leads (SS57L). The electrodes were attached to 
the non-cleaned distal phalanges of the index and middle fingers of the dominant hand.  
All signal data were first subjected to visual analysis before any formal analysis. 
Artefacts, if present, were removed by applying a baseline smoothing algorithm by down-
sampling the signal in steps of 200 samples / sec.  Data were analysed using Biopac’s 
AcqKnowledge v4.1 software, running custom programmed Find-Cycles routines on the 
signal (Braithwaite, Watson, Jones, & Rowe, 2013d).  SCRs were quantified as deflections 
crossing a threshold of 0.01µs (microsiemens) from the background signal, and defined as a 
delta function between the onset of the SCR (defined by the threshold) and the maximum 
peak amplitude reached in that SCR (see example signal in Figure 1). SCRs less than 10% of 
the maximum peak were discarded from the analysis.  
All SCR data (deltas) were initially normalised via the Log (SCR+1) correction to 
make them suitable for parametric analysis (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007; Boucsein et al., 
2012).  Normalized SCRs were then standardised to correct for individual differences via a z-
score transformation (z = (X - μ) / σ) following the recommendations of Ben-Shakhar, (1985; 
1987). To do this, SCRs from both conditions (synchronous / asynchronous) were merged, 
with all SCRs pooled to calculate a representative mean and standard deviation, per 
participant5. This ensured that any differences in threat-SCR amplitudes were comparable 
across different participants.   
 
Finger / Body Temperature 
Body temperature was measured by a second channel configured on the MP36R unit, sampled 
at 7.8Hz, via a finger digit sensor (SS18LA) attached to the distal phalange of the index finger 
of the non-dominant hand that was hidden from view.  Hand / finger-temperature 
                                                          
5 Note, there were no significant differences in the amplitudes of the non-specific SCRs between the groups (both Fs <1).  
Only the main effect of brushing condition was reliable (F (1, 153) = 9.87, p = .002).  Therefore, pooling the signals is 
validated. 
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measurements are considered sensitive and reliable indexes of an individual’s overall body 
temperature and thermal comfort (Wang, Zhang, Arens, & Huizenga, 2007).  
 
Procedure  
All sensors (for SCRs and body temperature) were attached 15 mins before the start of the 
experiment to ensure good quality contact was made, and that the readings from the 
temperature sensor had stabilized before recording began.  For the initial section of the 
experiment the questionnaires relating to aberrant and anomalous experiences (CAPS and 
CDS) were administered to all participants, and the OBE questionnaire was included when 
applicable. Once completed, the RHI procedure was administered. Participants sat in front of 
a wooden frame fixed to a table. They were instructed to maintain fixation on the rubber-hand 
throughout the RHI procedure; which comprised of an initial 60-second baseline period, 
followed by 150-seconds of brushing, the threat-procedure, and lastly a 60-second post-threat 
baseline period.  All participants received synchronous (visual and tactile stimuli occurred 
together) and asynchronous (visual and tactile stimuli occurred individually) brushing at a 
frequency of approximately 1Hz. The order of brushing conditions was counterbalanced 
across participants. Following each condition, participants were given the RHI Exit 
Questionnaire (see Appendix A). 
During the task, participants simultaneously observed a realistic androgynous rubber-
hand (a movie prop) being brushed and felt brushing stimulation on their real hand, which 
was hidden from view. Participants were instructed to place their non-dominant hand through 
a curtain and on to a lower panel, ensuring their real (brushed) hand was obscured from view. 
A rubber-hand was placed onto an upper level platform, 8cm above the participant’s own 
hidden hand, at approximately 20° inclination from the participant. The hand was positioned 
in an anatomically congruent position to that of their real hand / arm; a factor known to be 
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important for eliciting strong illusions (Tsakiris & Haggard 2005). To increase the 
believability of the illusion, participants were asked to wear the plain white blouse / shirt 
provided, which covered their upper body. The rubber-hand was secured into the sleeve, so 
that only the rubber-hand / forearm were visible, and gave the impression of protruding from 
clothing being worn by the participant. Participants were informed that after a fixed time 
period of brushing, a realistic threat would be delivered to the rubber-hand. This verbal 
instruction was given to reduce any surprise / startle response, and to measure true autonomic 
arousal related to a 'perceived threat' (cf. Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). The threat came in 
the form of a simulated 'blood giving’ procedure. To ensure an accurate representation of an 
injection procedure, a highly realistic syringe (custom made film prop) fitted with a 2.5-inch 
retractable needle approached the rubber-hand, and was seemingly ‘inserted’ into the skin. 
Once inserted, the plunger was slowly pulled back and the syringe began to fill with 
approximately 3cm of simulated blood (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to maintain 
fixation on the needle / rubber-hand during the whole process. This procedure was repeated 
for both the synchronous and asynchronous brushing conditions (counterbalanced across 
participants).   
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Figure 1. Example of the experimental set up used in the current study. After the brushing 
period, a realistic syringe with a retractable needle was plunged into the rubber-hand. Then 
the plunger was pulled back and the syringe seemingly filled with blood - simulating a 
realistic blood-giving procedure (left). In parallel with this, SCRs were measured as an 
objective index of fear / emotion (right). The threat-related SCR is denoted on the signal 
(threat delivered, right figure) amongst the other background SCRs (known as Non Specific-
SCRs: NS-SCRs). Finger temperature was also measured (not shown here).   
 
Results 
A total of 180 participants were tested, and based on established criteria for identifying non-
responders in terms of flat EDA profiles, (Boucsein, 2012; Dawson et al., 2007), 25 
participants (14%) were removed from the analysis due to being hypo-responsive6. In general, 
these participants produced fewer than 2 NS-SCRs during the entire RHI procedure (across 
the merged signals).  The analysis was conducted on the remaining 155 participants (92% 
female), of which 25 were defined as the OBE group (88% female) and 130 as the control 
group (93% female). Where appropriate (as indicated via Shapiro-Wilks tests), non-
                                                          
6Around 10% of healthy control populations and approximately 25% of psychopathic populations are typically non-
responders (for discussion see Dawson et al. 2007). 
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parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were applied to non-normally distributed data, p-values 
were corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction.  For the parametric 
comparisons the unequal sample sizes had no implications for homogeneity of variance 
between the groups (the ratio difference in standard deviation between the groups never 
exceeded 1.21 and the Levene’s tests failed to be reliable - suggesting similar variance). 
Effect size is denoted as r for non-parametric (Mann Whitney U) tests and partial eta squared 
( 2P ) and Cohen’s d are used for ANOVAs and t-tests (see Cohen 1988; 1992). 
 
Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale (CAPS) 
First, the responses for items on the CAPS were analysed (without the 11 TLE items). The 
OBE group produced significantly elevated scores on these items, relative to the control 
group, U (25, 130) = 988.50, p < .005, r = .25 (Figure 2). Further, the OBE group also 
experienced these perceptions significantly more frequently than the control group, as 
indicated by the frequency of experiences rating scale, U (25, 130) = 1,017.50, p < .005, r = 
.24; Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. Average CAPS Yes / No scores (scored 1/0 for each question) on the left and 
average CAPS Frequency scores (scored 1 - 5) on the right for the OBE and control groups 
(error bars indicate ±1 SE).   
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TLE Factor 
The Yes/No responses for the 11-item TLE factor were analysed. The OBE group had 
significantly higher TLE scores than the control group, U (25, 130) 917.00, p < .001, r = .28. 
Furthermore, the OBE group also reported a greater frequency of such experiences U (25, 
130) 934.00, p < .001, r = .27 (Figure 3). These results suggest that the OBE group 
experienced more anomalous perceptions and more frequently, relative to the control group. 
 
Figure 3. Average TLE Yes / No scores (scored 1/0 per question) on the left and average TLE 
Frequency scores (scored 1-5 per question) on the right for the OBE and control groups (error 
bars indicate 1 ±SE). 
 
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) 
The OBE group had higher total CDS scores than the controls (OBE X  = 45.56, controls X  
= 25.15; U (25, 130) = 770.00, p < .001, r = .33). Moreover, 16% of the OBE group obtained 
a score of 70 or above (compared to 2% of the control group).  Next, the four factors 
identified from the CDS were explored individually to identify specific biases in anomalous 
experience. When corrected for multiple comparisons, Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that 
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ABE (Anomalous Body Experiences), U (25, 130) = 498.00, p < .001, r = .45; and AFS 
(Alienation from Surroundings), U (25, 130) = 842.50, p < .001, r = .31. The two remaining 
factors did not differ significantly, EN (Emotional Numbing), U (25, 130) = 1,250.00, p = .06, 
r = .15 and ASR (Anomalous Sensory Recall), U (25, 130) = 1,414.00, p = .304, r = .08 
(although the EN factor was borderline; see Figure 4). Importantly, these results go against 
the notion that the OBE group responses were being overly influenced by a generic response 
bias / power of suggestion. If this were true, all four factors should have been reliably 
increased for the OBE group. Clearly this was not the case.  
 
 
Figure 4. Average scores of each CDS Factor, for the OBE and control groups (error bars 
indicate ±1 SE; data corrected for unequal items on each factor). 
 
In summary, the findings reveal that the OBE group reported significantly elevated degrees of 
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factors, demonstrated that the OBE group were not simply more suggestible or prone to 
response bias compared to the control group. 
 
RHI Exit Questionnaire - control questions 
The ratings for the control questions were pooled for each participant.  Although negative in 
both cases, across the entire sample, control items were endorsed more strongly in the 
synchronous compared with the asynchronous brushing condition, and this difference was 
reliable, (Sync X = -1.21, Async X = -1.98; t (154) = 6.47, p < .001, d = 0.52). The control 
item differences were explored via a 2 (Group: OBE vs. control) × 2 (Brushing condition: 
synchronous vs. asynchronous) mixed ANOVA which revealed a significant main effect of 
Brushing, F (1, 153) = 9.05, p < .005, 2P = .056, but no main effect of Group, F (1, 153) = 
.71, p = .402, 2P = .005. There was also a significant Brushing × Group interaction, F (1, 153) 
= 7.43, p < .01, 2P = .046. At first glance, the interaction may be taken as evidence for a 
difference in suggestibility for the OBE (hallucination) group.  However, an examination of 
Figure 5 suggests this might not be the best way to interpret this finding.  Control item ratings 
were the same for the OBE group in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions, and both 
of these corresponded to the control group ratings in the synchronous condition.  In other 
words, none of the ratings from the OBE group were endorsed more positively than those 
from the synchronous condition for the control group. Instead, the interaction appears to be 
driven by the control group’s stronger tendency to reject the items under the asynchronous 
condition only.   
 Additional exploration using paired t-tests revealed that the control group reported 
significantly greater negativity in the asynchronous compared to synchronous brushing 
condition, t (129) = 7.20, p < .001, d = 0.63, whereas the OBE group showed no difference, t 
(24) = .15, p = .884, d = 0.03. In addition, independent t-tests revealed that the OBE and 
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control group did not differ significantly in their endorsement of control items for the 
synchronous condition, t (153) = -.42, p = .675, d = 0.09.  The difference between the groups 
for the asynchronous condition approached significance, t (153) = 1.88, p = .062, d = 0.41.   
 
 
Figure 5. Mean control ratings for the OBE and control groups in synchronous and 
asynchronous brushing conditions (error bars indicate ±1 SE). 
 
RHI Exit Questionnaire - Embodiment questions 
The ratings for the individual embodiment / illusion questions were pooled into one score.  
Endorsement of the Embodiment items provides a measure of the subjective strength of the 
illusion.  Across the whole sample, the strength of endorsement for the embodiment items was 
significantly stronger with synchronous than with asynchronous brushing, (Sync X = 2.72, 
Async X = .14: t (154) = 14.73, p < .001, d = 1.18).  This is the basic RHI effect. 
 A 2 (Group: OBE vs. control) × 2 (Brushing condition: synchronous vs. 
asynchronous) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Brushing condition, F (1, 
153) = 90.21, p < .001, 2P = .37, a significant main effect of Group, F (1, 153) = 6.54, p < 
.02, 2P = .04 and a significant Brushing × Group interaction, F (1, 153) = 4.70, p < .05, 
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asynchronous) was found in both the OBE group, t (24) = 4.61, p < .001, d = 0.92, and the 
control group, t (129) = 14.20, p < .001, d = 1.25.  Independent t-tests revealed that for the 
asynchronous condition, the strength of RHI endorsement was greater for the OBE group than 
for the control group, t (153) = 2.79, p = .01, d = 0.64, but there was no significant group 
difference for the synchronous condition, t (153) = 1.51, p = .133, d = 0.33. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean Embodiment ratings for the OBE and control groups in synchronous and 
asynchronous brushing conditions (error bars indicate ±1 SE). 
 
Findings from the Embodiment items on the RHI Exit Questionnaire suggest a distinction 
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(Group: OBE vs. control) × 2 (Brushing condition: synchronous vs. asynchronous) mixed 
ANOVA. This revealed significant main effects of Brushing, F (1, 153) = 11.91, p < .001, 2P
= .07, and Group, F (1, 153) = 6.49, p < .02, 2P = .04, and a significant Brushing × Group 
interaction, F (1, 153) = 6.94, p = .01, 2P = .04 (see Figure 7).  Follow-up t-tests showed that 
for the control group, a typical RHI effect was observed; there were significantly larger threat-
SCRs in the synchronous compared with the asynchronous brushing condition, t (129) = 7.60, 
p < .001, d = 0.67. However, in contrast to this, the OBE group displayed no such reliable 
differences, t (24) = .44, p = .665, d = 0.09. Two independent t-tests, revealed that the groups 
did not differ reliably in the strength of their SCRs during the synchronous condition, t (153) 
= .59, p = .557, d = 0.12, but the OBE group displayed significantly larger threat-SCRs in the 
asynchronous condition compared with controls, t (153) = 3.39, p < .001, d = 0.75 (see Figure 
7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Standardised threat-related SCRs (z-scores) for the OBE and control groups for both 
synchronous and asynchronous brushing conditions. The higher the score, the larger the 
emotional response towards the syringe / blood giving procedure (error bars indicate ±1 SE). 
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Body Temperature 
The body-temperature signal (degrees Celsius, °C) was divided into three epochs: (1) the 
baseline period before brushing began (60-seconds); (2) the brushing period itself (150-
seconds) and (3) the post-threat period (60-seconds). The mean temperature was then 
calculated for each of the three epochs separately for the synchronous and asynchronous 
brushing conditions. 
 These data were explored via a Group (OBE vs control) × Brushing condition 
(synchronous vs asynchronous) x Time period (1 vs 2 vs 3) mixed ANOVA which revealed 
no significant main effects or interactions (all Fs < 2.6; all Ps > .111; Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8. Mean body temperature for the OBE and control groups during synchronous and 
asynchronous brushing conditions as a function of trial epoch (error bars indicate ±1 SE). 
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General Discussion 
The present study examined the role of intersensory biases in the mediation of an 
experimentally induced body illusion, in those predisposed to spontaneous OBEs. Subjective 
and objective measures of the strength of emotional / fear responses to perceived body threats 
were quantified under both synchronous (illusion) and asynchronous (baseline) stimulation 
conditions. Several new findings were revealed.    
 In terms of subjective measures, the illusion was rated as being stronger under 
synchronous brushing conditions, relative to asynchronous brushing conditions - replicating 
the basic RHI effect across the sample (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998).  In addition, and surprisingly, those prone to spontaneous OBEs rated the illusion as 
being significantly stronger relative to the control group, but only for the asynchronous 
condition. There was no reliable difference in the subjective strength of the illusion for the 
synchronous brushing condition between the two groups.  The selective effects of perceived 
embodiment also go against a generic response bias account for the results of the OBE group.   
 Overall, standardised threat SCRs were much stronger in the synchronous condition, 
relative to the asynchronous condition (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2007; 
Guterstam et al., 2011). This is consistent with the notion that observers were, on the whole, 
showing greater fear responses to threats where the visual and tactile stimulation were 
coupled, and leading to the interpretation that the rubber-hand was part of the physical body.   
 What was striking about the SCR findings was the observation that there were no 
reliable threat differences between the brushing conditions for the OBE group.  Threats 
delivered under the asynchronous brushing condition produced fear responses that were just 
as strong as those under the synchronous condition, but only for those predisposed to aberrant 
body experiences (OBEs).  The threat was perceived just as strongly even though the visuo-
tactile contingencies were uncoupled in the asynchronous condition.  
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 In addition, not only did the OBE group display no reliable difference between the 
brushing conditions, but the threat SCRs were significantly stronger than the control group’s 
SCRs in the asynchronous condition. These findings are consistent with the questionnaire 
data; the OBE group demonstrated increased endorsement in the asynchronous condition in 
terms of their threat-related SCRs and felt embodiment of the rubber-hand compared to the 
control group.  
Finger-temperature measurements were inconclusive.  There was no evidence for 
reliable drops in finger-temperature for the RHI illusion protocol or as a fear / anxiety 
response towards the threat.  These null findings add to other research also failing to replicate 
effects for finger temperature measurements as an indicator of the RHI (Hohwy & Paton, 
2010; Marasco, Kim, Colgate, Peshkin & Kuiken, 2011; Paton et al., 2012; Rohde, Wold, 
Karnath & Ernst, 2013).  Of note, the lack of an effect here cannot simply be explained by our 
brushing conditions being too short in duration because previous studies have reported effects 
of temperature at comparable and indeed shorter durations (Hohwy & Paton, 2010; Kammers 
et al., 2011; Thakkar et al., 2011).  As a consequence, the role of finger-temperature as a 
reliable indicator of body ownership in the RHI remains contentious and we do not speculate 
further on these specific findings.      
 For both the subjective strength of the illusion and the SCR data, the crucial 
differences between the groups were clearly present for the asynchronous brushing condition 
and absent for the synchronous condition.  Why might this be the case?  One possibility is that 
in the synchronous condition performance might have been at ceiling for both groups. That is, 
the visuo-tactile cues might have been so strong and convincing for both groups, that it 
masked any possible delineating factors between the groups - at least in the absence of any 
psychopathology or psycho-active agents. These findings are also in line with our previous 
study in which there were no reliable differences between those predisposed to more general 
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anomalous body experiences and controls, on subjective ratings of the strength of the illusion 
(Braithwaite et al., 2014).  
    
Overarching theoretical accounts: Some speculations.   
Our findings show, for the first time, the presence of intersensory biases in those predisposed 
to OBEs.  As well as being associated with self-reports of spontaneous occurrence of bodily 
hallucinations, these biases were also revealed under the experimental conditions of the RHI.  
The observation that the fear response was equivalent under both synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions was striking, even more so when it is noted that this bias was 
observed for non-clinical groups.   
The lack of a difference in fear responses for the OBE group suggests the presence of 
habitual biases in the processing and integration of multisensory information in those 
predisposed to OBEs.  Sensitivity to the temporal congruency of incoming sensory 
information is a fundamental principle of all multisensory integration accounts (Blanke & 
Metzinger, 2009; Stein & Stanford, 2008) and thus, any deviation from optimal integration 
will have implications for coherent embodiment and self-consciousness.   
One view could be that the OBE group displayed less precision in the coding of visuo-
tactile integration. This in itself could reflect a difference in their sensitivity to visual tactile 
asynchronies and / or the timing of integration itself – a prediction made and accounted for 
within both dysconnection and multisensory accounts (Braithwaite et al., 2014; Costantini et 
al., 2016).   
However, Kapur's (2003) notion of aberrant salience does not explain why the 
hallucination group here did not report stronger illusions or produce stronger fear SCRs for 
the synchronous condition (relative to control groups).  Although the overall pattern of 
responses (no difference between synchronous and asynchronous) might be described as 
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aberrant, or at least non-typical, the OBE group did not produce significantly stronger SCRs 
for the synchronous brushing condition – suggesting that the overall level of response was 
well within the standard range of responses.     
Predictive coding accounts of multisensory integration would argue that top-down 
priors are being overly aggressive or liberal in their explaining away of prediction errors to a 
degree beyond that required to maintain an accurate distinction of me / my body 
(interoception) relative to my surroundings / environment (exteroception).  Ultimately, in this 
context predictive coding processes are asking, "what is the probability that these signals are 
coming from me?" and they are over-including things that are me when in fact they are not 
(Seth, 2009; 2013; 2014; Seth & Friston, 2016; Seth et al., 2012; Critchley et al., 2004; see 
also Barrett & Simmons,2015; Bechara & Naqvi, 2004; Herbert et al., 2011).  The 
consequence of this process is an aberrant feeling of embodiment for the rubber-hand (as 
evidenced by exit questionnaire responses) and aberrant emotional responses (as evidenced by 
SCRs) under conditions even when the visuo-tactile contingencies are not tightly coupled.  
Ultimately this is somewhat akin to a Type I error, in that the system decides there is a 
significant me signal when in fact it should not.         
 Interestingly, there is wider support for the ideas being discussed here. For example, 
Morgan et al., (2011) showed that the strength of the RHI is augmented by ketamine, a 
substance known to replicate the symptoms of psychosis and produce an altered sense of self.  
Crucially, the effects of the illusion were enhanced in the ketamine condition (relative to a 
placebo condition), and this occurred even under asynchronous brushing conditions (see also; 
Corlett et al., 2007; 2009, for an expanded discussion in relation to predictive coding). These 
findings share some similarity to those of the present study in that either an administered drug 
(Morgan et al., 2011) or already present biases in multisensory integration (predisposition to 
OBEs) can lead to an increased tendency to accept ownership of an illusory limb. This occurs 
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even when there is contradiction between sensory information (the asynchronous condition).  
However, the present findings are even more striking in that the difference typically observed 
between the brushing conditions was completely abolished for the autonomic SCR measures 
here, and that this occurred in sub-clinical hallucinators.  
 As noted in the Introduction, dysconnection accounts are not necessarily in conflict 
with multisensory integration or predictive coding accounts as all may co-exist with one being 
more of a cause (dysconnection) and the other more of a consequence (e.g., a breakdown in 
multisensory integration, timing, and a resultant sensory bias). We acknowledge that the 
overarching theoretical ideas explored here are speculative.  The current study provides no 
direct measure or manipulation of interoceptive sensitivity as a predictor of the RHI illusion 
thus the specific issue of whether higher or lower sensitivity is meaningfully related to the 
illusion or OBEs remains unclear.  Nonetheless, our study provides the first objective 
evidence that those predisposed to hallucinatory OBEs show habitual biases in multisensory 
integration as revealed by specific response patterns to the RHI.  This could be due to 
imprecise or failures of predictions, dysconnection in multisensory networks, aberrant biases 
in the timing of integrative processes, or a combination of the above.  Therefore, exactly how 
such biases manifest themselves is now an important matter for future research. 
 
Diverse aberrant experiences 
Our findings support the view that aberrant perceptions experienced as part of the OBE are 
distinct from those reported in DPD (Braithwaite et al., 2013c; Gabbard et al., 1982; Kessler 
& Braithwaite, 2016).  Such observations may have important implications for the 
development of predictive coding accounts proposed for aberrations in self-consciousness.  
Previous research has shown that patients with DPD show a suppressed emotional response to 
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aversive stimuli - which may go some way to explaining the specific types of anomalous 
experiences reported (Sierra, 2009; Sierra & David, 2011).   
In contrast, the OBE is often described as being extremely vivid, 3-dimensional, and 
convincing - aspects that no doubt contribute to the often 'paranormal / spiritual' 
interpretations of such instances (Blackmore, 1982; Cook & Irwin, 1983; Irwin, 1985).  If 
both forms of distorted self-consciousness / presence arise due to imprecision in top-down 
priors, then the notion of imprecision may occur in a number of ways or at different levels 
within a hierarchically organised processing system.  The challenge then becomes how to 
formulate the predictive coding account to explain both forms of aberrant experience which 
while both dissociative, relate to a diverse phenomenology.     
 The present findings provide evidence for an increased emotional / fear response in 
one of the conditions which is not consistent with the general findings of suppressed 
emotional reactivity from DPD groups.  In the asynchronous condition, the OBE group 
reported phenomenologically stronger illusions, and stronger SCRs in reaction to the threat 
(relative to the control group) - suggestive of stronger integration thus resulting in an 
increased emotional reaction to the threat.     
If a predictive coding account is to be fostered for these types of experiences, we 
suggest that these findings extend the notion of imprecision in priors in important ways.  For 
example, in terms of DPD, as discussed in recent theoretical accounts by Seth and colleagues 
(Seth, 2009; 2013; 2014; Seth & Friston, 2016; Seth et al., 2012), imprecise predictions 
(priors) may lead to a failure to correctly integrate veridical interoceptive body signals with 
exteroceptive information - leading to the false probabilistic interpretation that signals are not 
me when indeed they are (under-embodiment).  Such imprecision is argued to cause 
attenuation in the sense of presence.  This process thus leads to the feeling of dissociation and 
disconnection from the bodily self in that the body no longer feels real to these patients due to 
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a remaining and aberrant degree of prediction error.  Put simply, imprecision results in a 
weakened saliency of the egocentric sense of a feeling of self.    
 In contrast, for dissociative experiences like the OBE, imprecision may work in a 
different way or reflect prediction error at a different level of hierarchically organised 
networks important for presence and embodiment.  Here, imprecise priors may lead to an 
over-embodiment when the false probabilistic interpretation is that 'it is me' when in fact, it is 
not.  By this account, accurate representations of the bodily-self typically supported by 
feedback from integrative processes, may become unreliable and weakened (as with DPD), 
whilst at the same time the observer connects more strongly to external / exocentric 
representations of the self or surroundings and thus feel out of body.  A weakened or 
attenuated connection to sensory signals which maintain a stable and coherent sense of bodily 
self in space, at a given time, may unite the OBE and DPD, but in the case of the former, 
additional processes appear to mediate the experience of connection to an exocentric point in 
space.  It is as yet unclear what these additional processes might be, but accounts of shared-
body representations being important for action and emotion, and disorders of body-
ownership have been proposed within Bayesian / predictive coding frameworks (Ishida, 
Suzuki, & Grandi, 2015).  In addition, exocentric representations / perspective-taking 
mechanisms are also an important part of spatial cognition and have shown associations with 
the occurrence of OBEs as well as having been argued to be important on theoretical grounds 
(Braithwaite & Dent, 2011; Braithwaite et al., 2013c, Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016).        
 It is interesting to note that many contextual situations known to be conducive to the 
induction of an OBE, which include the use of floatation tanks, meditative techniques 
requiring the body remain still for prolonged periods of time, sensory deprivation, or 
instances of sleep paralysis, all imply situations where feedback from body signals (i.e., 
proprioceptive / vestibular / somatosensory) become ambiguous, unreliable and less 
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predictable.  Indeed, on a more general and anecdotal note, we have interviewed observers 
who reported OBEs occurring during ski jumps and parachuting - where the acceleration 
experienced was far more severe than that expected.  Again, such instances may represent 
situations that make the incoming exteroceptive signals unable to be accounted for by 
predictive priors and hence unable to support a veridical and stable sense of self. 
 One potential puzzle is that given the OBE group scored high on measures of 
Depersonalization / Derealization (the CDS questionnaire), why didn’t they show the same 
pattern as patients with DPD reported in the wider literature (i.e., a suppressed emotional 
response, not an enhanced one)?  One possibility is that although the OBE group did score 
high on the CDS, this was only on two sub-scales of the measure - which suggests a more 
selective bias for those predisposed to OBEs.  In addition, it may well be that some of the 
anomalous-body experiences associated with DPD may also occur co-morbidly with the OBE 
- though the presence of OBEs suggests additional processes might also be present.  Evidence 
for this assertion is that although high CDS scores can co-occur with predisposition to OBEs, 
having the OBE selectively enhances performance at an exocentric perspective-taking task 
(Braithwaite et al., 2013c; see Kessler & Braithwaite, 2016; for a more extensive discussion).   
 A further possibility refers to the CDS measure itself which may lack precision in 
delineating the subtle differences between anomalous experiences in DPD and the OBE, and 
so elevated scores on the CDS may reflect ambiguity in the items on the measure with respect 
to the subtle differences between these dissociative experiences.  The true nature of 
phenomenological differences between anomalous experiences of self and presence in DPD 
and the OBE, reliably captured by a validated measure, awaits clarification. 
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Future Research 
Previous studies have shown that perturbations of the RHI protocol can influence the illusion. 
For example, altering the plausible orientation of the rubber-hand with respect to the body, 
altering skin tone, realism, and distance of the rubber hand to the observers body all reduce 
the strength of the illusion (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Guterstam et al., 2011; Haans, Ijsselsteijn & 
de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  However, on the basis of our asynchronous 
condition findings it is possible that OBE groups would show much smaller (or even no) 
reduction in responses to such perturbations. Therefore, one avenue of future research would 
be to examine the rate and range of circumstances under which the illusion survives for those 
predisposed to the OBE relative to a reduction in responses measured / reported by control 
groups. On a different note, Longo et al., (2008) noted sub-divisions of embodiment, arguing 
for a separation between the concepts of ownership, agency and location.  Accordingly, it 
would be worth examining how these separable factors might map onto predisposition to the 
OBE and other related aberrant experiences in self-consciousness (i.e., depersonalization 
experiences, autoscopy, heautoscopy and anomalous body experiences in psychosis / 
schizophrenia and schizotypy) to gain a more fine grained and selective understanding of the 
nature of the biases in multisensory integration underlying disorders in self-consciousness, 
embodiment and presence.  Finally, we suggest that future investigations of the RHI should 
screen all participants for predisposition to anomalous bodily experiences – even if such 
predisposition is not the main focus of the study.  Not doing so leaves open the possibility that 
such samples include individuals prone to DPD or OBE type experiences as well as true 
controls with little or no predisposition at all.  Based on the findings from the current study 
and the growing wider literature, such imprecision will have implications for the nature of the 
conclusions that can be drawn.          
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Conclusion  
In the current study we have demonstrated that biases in multisensory integration are 
associated with a predisposition to aberrant experiences of the bodily self, even for sub-
clinical hallucinators.  One possibility is that those prone to OBEs make less precise 
predictions and over-attribute visuo-tactile contingencies as coming from themselves, leading 
to distinct dissociative experiences in self-consciousness (as revealed by the data in 
asynchronous brushing conditions).  Our study goes significantly beyond previous work by 
demonstrating that biases, previously thought to be present only in psychopathology and 
psychosis, may also be present (albeit in attenuated form) in sub-clinical populations, are 
measurable in between hallucinatory episodes, (suggesting such aberrant multisensory 
integration may be a general background trait), and that biases for the OBE appear to be 
related to a specific form of imprecision. Finally, the observation that some hallucinators 
experience a strong RHI even in asynchronous conditions has important implications for all 
studies of the RHI as such individuals may well influence the findings of studies that have not 
screened for relevant participant characteristics.      
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Appendix A: Rubber Hand Illusion Exit Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
Question Measurement Item 
1. It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I saw the 
rubber hand touched. 
Embodiment 
2. It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the rubber 
hand. 
Embodiment 
3. I felt as if the rubber hand was my own. Embodiment 
4. It felt as if my (real) hand were drifting towards the rubber hand. Control 
5. It seemed as if I may have more than one hand or arm. Control 
6. It seemed as if the touch I was feeling came from somewhere between my own hand and 
the rubber hand. 
Control 
7. It felt as if my hand was becoming ‘rubbery’ Control 
8. It appeared (visually) as if the rubber hand were drifting towards my (real) hand Control 
9. The rubber hand began to resemble my own (real) hand, in terms of shape/size/skin tone 
or some other visual feature. 
Embodiment 
10. It felt as if the rubber hand was connected in some way to my body. Embodiment 
11. I had the feeling that if I had tried to move my hand, the rubber hand would have moved. Embodiment 
12. I felt as if my hand (being stroked with the paintbrush) was bigger than my other hand 
(which wasn’t being stroked). 
Control 
13. My (real) hand being stroked felt as if it changed in temperature i.e. became hotter or 
colder (please circle which) 
Control 
14. I couldn't feel my real hand being stroked with the paintbrush. Control 
15. How believable was the illusion? Embodiment 
Aberrant emotion & the OBE 
Page  54 
 
Appendix B: Out-of-Body Experience Screening Questionnaire 
 
An out-of-body experience (OBE) can be defined as “an experience in which a person seems 
to perceive the world from a location outside of their physical body”.  The following 
questions concern the details of the OBE you believe you have experienced. We would 
appreciate it if you could be as honest as possible when giving your answers. All answers are 
completely confidential. 
 
Initials:______________       Age:_________ Gender:________ 
Handedness:__________ 
 
1. Have you ever experienced the world from a vantage point outside of the physical body (an 
OBE)? 
  Definitely Not               Definitely Yes 
      1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
2. To what extent do you feel 'connected to / aware of’ your physical body during your 
OBE(s)? 
Definitely Not               Definitely Yes 
      1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
3. To what extent do you feel 'connected to / aware of' being located at an external (from 
physical self) point of view during your OBE(s)? 
Definitely Not               Definitely Yes 
      1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
4. If you have experienced an OBE, has this happened more than once? 
 
  No (only once)     Yes (more than once) 
  
 
5. How frequently would you say you have experienced OBE(s)? 
  
    Don't know    Very infrequently                   Very frequently 
  0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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6.  How vivid would you describe your experience(s) 
 
       Don't know    Extremely non-vivid         Extremely vivid 
  0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
7. Were you relaxed and at ease at the time of your experience(s)? 
 
      Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
  0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. Was there a visual component to the experience – where you visually perceived the world 
from a different vantage point outside of your physical self? 
 
              Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
  0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. If your OBE(s) involved a visual component, did you see a representation of your physical 
body during the experience(s)? 
 
             Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
  0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
10. Are your OBE(s) best characterised as a strong feeling or sensation of being in a different    
    location to the physical self with no visual component to the experience? 
 
   Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
                 0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
11. Did you feel completely detached from your physical body during the OBE(s)? 
 
            Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
                 0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
12. In what position was your physical body during the OBE(s)? (circle all that apply) 
 Laying down (supine)     Sitting down     Standing up     Don’t know     Not applicable 
 
 Other (please give details) __________ 
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13. Relative to your physical body, in what position in external space did you perceive the 
world from? (circle all that apply) 
     Directly above           Above & in front            Above & to the side            Above & behind      
     Directly Below         Below & in front            Below & to the side    Below & behind 
     Directly to the side    Don’t know  Not applicable          
     
Other (please give details) __________ 
 
14. Were you in control of your detached self during the experience(s) so that you could 'will'  
     yourself to move around?    
   
  Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
                 0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
15. Approximately how long did the experience(s) last?  
 Don't know  Please give approximate details (in secs / mins) 
_________________ 
 
 
16. Do any of these sensations accompany your OBE(s) (circle as many / few as apply) 
Floating     Dissociation     Tingling sensations Ringing in the ears     Fear       
Bliss        Confusion      Clarity     Falling     Intense emotional feelings       Dizziness     
Nausea     Numbness     Duality of consciousness     Apprehension     Shifts in body 
temperature        Paralysis   Heightened senses        Suppressed / foggy senses 
    
 Other (please give details) ______________________________________ 
 
 
17. As an experience, was your OBE(s) convincing at the time it was occurring? 
 
 Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
                 0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18. Is the context(s) typically associated with your OBE(s) best described as traumatic or 
highly stressful? 
 
   Don't know         Definitely not                      Definitely yes  
                 0   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Different for different instances? Yes / No 
 Details_________________________________ 
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19. How long ago was your most recent experience? 
 
   Don't know        Years________: Months:__________ Weeks:______ 
Days:________      
 
 
20. Do you suffer from Migraine? 
   Yes (typically with aura) Yes (typically without aura)  
    
   No    Aura but no migraine 
 
 
21. Do you suffer from any form of epilepsy or any form of seizure? 
   Yes (with aura) Yes (without aura)     No 
Any further Details (e.g., temporal lobe / complex partial seizures):____________________ 
 
 
22. Have you ever had the feeling of unfamiliarity (however fleeting or sustained) for persons    
       that are well known and familiar to you? 
     No  Yes 
 (If Yes please rate the approximate frequency of occurrence below) 
  
 Don't know  Happens hardly at all                  Happens all the time 
        0            1   2    3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
23. Do you suffer from any form or neurological condition / disorder? 
       Yes / No (Further 
information)_____________ 
 
 
24. Were you taking any medication / substances at the time of the experience(s) 
       Yes / No (Further 
information)______________ 
 
  
Any further comments?..... 
